뉴욕타임즈 기사를 읽다가 보니, 1853년부터 뉴욕타임즈 기사를 Archive 한 것을 찾을 수 있었다. 아래와 같이 흥미로운 기사가 있어 한 번 읽어보았다. 역사속에서 배운것을 그 때 당시 한국에서는 이런 내용을 일부 사람만 알고 있었을텐데........
이 글은 1900년대 초 러일 간 한반도 지배권 다툼에 대한 외교·전략적 분석 기사입니다.
결국 이 논의는 1904~05년 러일전쟁과 이어지는 1910년 한일병합으로 귀결됩니다. 이 기사들은 당시 서구 언론이 동아시아의 정치 상황을 어떻게 보고 있었는지를 보여주는 중요한 역사적 자료입니다.
FOR A PARTITION OF KOREA.
It is from Paris that we should naturally expect to get even more of the “inside news” of the Russian beliefs and expectations than we can get from St. Petersburg itself. While it is extremely unlikely that the Russo-French alliance will be extended to the Far East, or that Russia would even wish so to extend it, Russia has a claim upon the benevolent neutrality, at least, of France, which is not likely to be dishonored. And the anonymous outgivings from Paris upon the question at issue between Russia and Japan, attributed to “veteran diplomatists" and the like, are likely to be better based than those from any other capital. Many of them bear the marks of proceeding from the French Foreign Office.
According to one of these outgivings, published in the Paris Eclair, Russia is quite willing to allow Japan a “free hand” in the south of Korea. It is only in the north part of the peninsula that Russian interests worth fighting about are conceived to lie. A “right of way” in the northern part she demands, in order to construct and operate a direct land route between her two great bases of Vladivostock and Port Arthur. But, as if in direct response to this suggestion, we have from The London Morning Post a statement, having equal pretensions to inferiority of information, of the reasons why Japan could not on any account consent to allowing Russia a lodgment in any part of the peninsula.
These reasons are numerous and cogent. The possession of any part of Korea would give Russia a “pou sto” for operations against Japan. It would be an additional menace. And it is too extensively forgotten that the issue of this quarrel, for Japan, as she sees it, is the issue of self-preservation. Even when the Japanese proceedings, to borrow a military metaphor, are tactically offensive, they are strategically defensive. That “wise and provident fear” which is “the mother of safety” is really the ruling motive of the Japanese statesmen. They have no notion at all of seeing their country blotted out of the map as an independent nationality, as China seems, in spite of all the efforts that can be made from the outside to help her, to be in the way to be blotted out. The great difference is that, in China, there seems to be no such sentiment as patriotism, while Japan is seething with it.
The difference may incidentally and properly attract the attention of those philosophers who maintain the unnecessary of sentiment to civilization, and who have been in the habit, or were in the habit before 1895, of adducing the Chinese as an example of a nation established on a purely secular and rational basis, which yet seemed to get on as well as others. But whether or not the Japanese are better than the Chinese for not being willing to see their country dismembered and oppressed without striking a blow or risking a scratch in her defense, but only asking where, in respect of money, each of them for himself may “come in” in the partition, the Japanese are not, as a matter of fact, that sort of people. They are not selling their birthrights for messes of pottage, each on his own individual account.
However this may be, there is a practical argument against the partition of Korea into Russian and Japanese “zones” which seems conclusive. It is the difficulty of “delimitation,” the impracticability of drawing the line. And, if the line were not sharply and clearly drawn, it would be a chronic source of quarrel. Russia needs Korea as the base of an attack upon Japan. It is not possible to assign to her any other overmastering motive for the control of the peninsula. Japan needs it as a “buffer” against Russia. The whole peninsula must come under one or the other control. Partition is out of the question.
기사 요약: FOR A PARTITION OF KOREA (한국 분할론에 대하여)
배경:
- 러시아와 일본은 한반도에서의 영향력을 두고 갈등 중.
- 프랑스발 외교 정보에 따르면, 러시아는 한반도 남부는 일본에 맡기고, 북부는 자국의 전략적 이익 구역으로 삼으려는 의도를 보임.
- 러시아는 **블라디보스토크와 여순(Port Arthur)**을 연결하는 육상 경로 확보를 요구함.
일본의 입장:
- 일본은 러시아가 한반도 어디든 점유하는 것을 국가 생존의 위협으로 간주.
- 러시아가 한반도에 거점을 갖는 것은 추가적인 군사 위협이자 일본 본토에 대한 압박이 됨.
- 일본의 태도는 전략적으로 방어적인 입장이며, 애국심과 자기 보존의 본능에서 비롯됨.
- 중국과는 달리, 일본은 자국이 “지도에서 지워지는 것”을 결코 허용하지 않겠다는 강한 의지를 가짐.
분할론에 대한 반박:
- 한반도를 러시아와 일본의 영향권으로 나누는 것은 현실적으로 불가능함.
- 그 이유는:
- 경계선 설정의 불명확성과 실행 불가능성 (delimitation problem)
- 상시적인 충돌의 원천이 될 가능성
- 러시아는 한반도를 공격 거점으로, 일본은 **완충지(buffer)**로 간주함.
- 결론적으로:"Partition is out of the question."
→ 분할은 고려할 수 없는 일이다.
요약 정리:
이 기사는 열강들의 지정학적 이해관계 속에서, 일본이 한반도 전체를 통제하려는 이유를 전략·안보·감정적 관점에서 설명하고 있으며, 한반도 분할안은 실행 불가능하고 위험한 발상이라고 결론 내립니다. 하지만, 대한제국은 1904~05년 러일전쟁과 이어지는 1910년 한일병합으로 마무리되어 역사에서 사라졌습니다.